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INTRODUCTION

Under the statutory standard of "just and reasonable" it is the result reached not the method employed which is controlling.
William 0. Douglas1

Arguably, the current and prospective nationwide natural gas
shortage 2 creates an immediate need for an incentive that will elicit
dedications of substantial new gas supplies to the interstate market

rather than the intrastate market.3 As an attempted solution, the
Federal Power Commission has promulgated Order No. 4354 for jurisdictional sales 5 of natural gas in the Rocky Mountain Area.6 The Coin-

0 B.A., Hobart College; LL.B., University of Pennsylvania Law School; Member,
District of Columbia & Maryland Bars.
1 FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944).
2 The natural gas supply crisis has been recognized by the Supreme Court in FPC v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621, 626 (1972), and by the District of Columbia
Circuit in Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 467 F.2d 361, 362 & n.l (D.C. Cir. 1972) and
Monsanto Co. v. FPC, 463 F.2d 799, 801 & n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
The deficit in the natural gas supply became progressively worse between 1968 and
1970 as the nation consumed twice as much in that period as was discovered and added
to reserves. Distrigas Corp., 47 F.P.C. 752, 761 (1972). A credible estimate of the prospective shortage was made in a Federal Power Commission staff report. FPC, STAFF REPORT
No. 2, NATIONAL GAS SUPPLY AND DEMAND

1971-1990

(1972).

It

showed the level of

unsatisfied demand for gas increasing from 3.6 trillion cubic feet (Tc) in 1975 to 9.5
Tf in 1980, 13.7 Tcf in 1985, and 17.1 Tcf in 1990. Id. at 123-24. The U.S. Geological
Survey estimated that the United States has 36.3 billion barrels of oil and gas reserves,
which will last for only 6.1 years. NEWSWEEK, May 21, 1973, at 78.

3 See MacAvoy, The Rationale for Regulation of Gas Field Prices in THE CIsIs oF
THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 152, 181-82 (1st ed. 1970); Miller, Competition and the
Public Interest in the Inter-State Gas and Electric Industries, 55 IOWA L REv. 570, 577

(1970).
4 46 F.P.C. 68 (1971). Order No. 435 is the subject of an appeal presently pending
in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. American Pub. Gas Ass'n v.
FPC, No. 71-1812 (D.C. Cir., filed OcL 12, 1971).
5 In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 682 (1954), the Supreme
Court ruled that the Commission has authority to regulate the wholesale price of gas
charged by the producer to the pipeline company when sold in interstate commerce.
However, the Federal Power Commission's authority over rates covers only prices charged
by gas producers for sales in interstate commerce for resale. For example, direct sales to
industrial users are unregulated. Thus, the jurisdiction of the FPC does not extend to all
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mission's objective was to shorten the regulatory hearing process by
substituting a rulemaking proceeding for the traditional but time consuming adjudicatory hearing method.
Order No. 435 raises broad questions concerning the authority of
the Commission, although acting in accordance with section 533(c) of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),7 to fix the terms and conditions, including initial rates not subject to refund, under which it will
markets supplied by gas producers. Consequently, the unregulated intrastate market has
become more attractive to gas producers than the interstate market. For a general discussion of regulation of independent natural gas producers and natural gas pipeline companies, see P. J. GARFIELD & W. F. LovEjoy, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMIcs 269-71, 294-350
(1964).
The decision in Phillips expanded the Commission's regulatory jurisdiction, which
previously covered only two hundred pipeline companies, to include several thousand
independent producers of natural gas. This brought on a deluge of requests for rate
changes. The situation quickly became intolerable and the Commission conceded its inability to deal with independent producers:
[I]f our present staff were immediately tripled, and if all new employees would
be as competent as those we now have, we would not reach a current status in
our independent producer rate work until 2043 A.D.-eighty-two and one half
years from now.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.P.C. 537, 546 (1960), aff'd sub nor. Wisconsin v. FPC, 303
F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1961), aff'd, 373 U.S. 294 (1963).
As a result, the Commission in 1960 divided the major gas producing regions into
geographical areas and, after hearings, set standards for initial rate filings and for increased rate filings on an area-by-area basis. See pp. 50-51 infra. In addition to the Rocky
Mountain Area, the other five areas were (1) the Permian Basin, which includes parts
of Texas and New Mexico; (2) Southern Louisiana, including the offshore Gulf of Mexico
area; (3) Hugoton-Anadarko, encompassing parts of Oklahoma and Kansas; (4) the Texas
Gulf Coast; and (5) other Southwest areas, including Mississippi, Arkansas, and parts of
Alabama, Texas, and Oklahoma. Breyer & MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Shortage and the
Regulation of Natural Gas Producers,86 HARv. L. REv. 941, 958 n.65 (1973).
One Federal Power Commission administrative law judge, after recommending approval of a $25 million rate increase in the Permian Basin Area, called for regulation of
the intrastate market to counteract the phenomenon occurring between 1968 and 1970
when one-half of all new gas discovered in the Permian Basin was sold in the intrastate
market. Washington Post, Dec. 21, 1972, § C, at 1, col. 5.
6 The Rocky Mountain Area consists of designated gas producing fields in Utah,
Colorado, Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska and New Mexico.
FPC, THE GAS SUPPLIES OF INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS PIPELINE COMPANIES 21 (1972). Its contribution to total United States production has remained relatively stable since 1956,
increasing from 4.6 per cent at that time to 6.2 per cent in 1961 and then gradually
decreasing to 5.0 per cent by 1970. FPC, STAFF REPORT No. 2, NATIONAL GAS SUPPLY AND
DEMAND 1971-1990, at 33 (1972).
7 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970) provides:
After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons
an opportunity to participate in the ruling making through submission of written
data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation.
After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate
in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose.
When rules are required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity
for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply instead of this
subsection.
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issue permanent certificates of public convenience and necessity for
new sales of natural gas in a producing area.8 Such a solution assumes
significance in light of the Commission's confessed difficulty in handling
its burgeoning workload9 and an apparent judicial abdication upon
review of the Commission's area rate orders.10
In particular, Order No. 435 warrants examination because it is an
instance in which an agency, which has been criticized for being inactive and unresponsive," has utilized its competence and expertise, on
an experimental basis, to respond with expedition to a crisis. 12 Second,
it is an example in which an agency, long operating under a substantive
8 The Commission's authority to set maximum and minimum rates for an entire
gas producing area on an industry-wide basis, pursuant to adjudicatory rulemaking
proceedings, has been sustained by the Supreme Court. Permian Basin Area Rate Proceedings, 34 F.P.C. 159 (1965), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Skelly Oil Co. v. FPC,
375 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1967), aff'd, Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
The Commission in Permian indicated that the ability to drill "directionally," that is,
to drill for the purpose of discovering gas rather than discovering gas as an associated
by-product while searching for oil, became significant in 1960. 34 F.P.C. at 189. The
directionality hypothesis provides the rationale for establishing a higher price for "new
gas" in order to elicit greater production. This hypothesis has been subject to criticism.
See Southern Louisiana Area Rate Cases (Austral) v. FPC, 428 F.2d 407, 417 n.15 (5th Cir.),
aff'd on rehearing,444 F.2d 125, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970).
9 The Federal Power Commission stated that in fiscal year 1970 fifty-nine companies
filed rate increase requests as compared with thirty-five companies during the previous fiscal
year. Of only ten requests disposed of during that year, eight were resolved by settlement.
1970 FPC ANN. REP. 62.
Judge Wilkey in Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 474 F.2d 416, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1972), observed:
The Federal Power Commission is confronted with an ever-increasing regulatory
burden-and limited resources. These [natural gas shortages] combine to produce
administrative delay and threaten the Commission's ability adequately to control
natural gas prices.
10 In Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968), the Supreme Court indi-

cated that the breadth and complexity of the responsibilities of the Commission were
such that its orders would not be overturned unless they produced arbitrary results:
We are not obliged to examine each detail of the Commission's decision; if the
"total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable,
judicial inquiry under the Act is at an end."
Id. at 767 (quoting from FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944)).
Accord, Southern Louisiana Area Rate Cases v. FPC, 428 F.2d 407, 418 (5th Cir.), aff'd
on rehearing, 444 F.2d 125, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970).
11 See McFarland, Landis' Report: The Voice o One Crying in the Wilderness,
47 VA. L. REv. 373, 419-20 (1961), in which Dean Landis' assertion is cited:
"[T]he Federal Power Commission without question represents the outstanding
example in the federal government of the breakdown of the administrative
process."
Id. (quoting from LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGNcItEs TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 54
(1960)).
12 See Judge Fahy's dissent in Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 474 F.2d 416, 424-25 (D.C. Cir.
1972). The majority held that the Commission exceeded its authority when it adopted
a rule exempting all existing and future sales by "small producers" from direct rate
regulation. Id. at 418. Judge Fahy would have affirmed on the ground that the exemption
was a lawful experiment by the Commission to cope with the gas shortage. Id. at 425.
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enabling statute (the Natural Gas Act),'3 seeks to mesh those statutory
requirements with the procedures set forth in the more recently enacted
14
Administrative Procedure Act.
Aside from a consensus among certain commentators that a federal administrative agency should exercise its rulemaking authority
broadly,1 5 an argument can be made that ratemaking by rule without
a full adjudicatory hearing is a denial of due process under the Natural
Gas Act and the APA. The essence of the opposition to Order No. 435
is that it sets rates, which may adversely affect the value of property,
without first giving the party procedural due process.
Under sections 4 and 5 of the Natural Gas Act, 16 a party is entitled
to an evidentiary hearing on the justness and reasonableness of its proposed or existing rate. However, Order No. 435 does not set specific
rates for a particular party. Rather, it promulgates by rule a rate level
at which the Commission will issue under section 717 of the Act a certificate of public convenience and necessity to any applicant without a
hearing. Order No. 435 is an attempt to dispense with the case by case
hearing process in order to divert volumes of gas to the interstate market by setting higher prices for new gas produced in the Rocky Mountain Area and sold in interstate commerce to pipeline companies after
June 17, 1970. Order No. 435 does not compel a natural gas producer
to initiate service at the rate set nor does it foreclose an applicant from
an adjudicatory hearing on the justness and reasonableness of a rate
filed in excess of the level established by it.
Recognizing that the desirability of a particular result is no justification for sanctioning administrative action which exceeds an agency's
statutory authority, 8 it is my conclusion that the Federal Power Commission, in promulgating Order No. 435, has followed the legally prescribed procedures and has taken the necessary steps within its discretion to deal with the natural gas shortage.
18 15 U.S.C. § 717 et seq. (1970).
14 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1970).
15 See Auerbach, Should Administrative Agencies Perform Adjudicatory Functions?,
1959 Wis. L. R . 95; Bagge, The Federal Power Commission, 11 B. C. IND. & COM. L
REv. 689 (1970); Fuchs, Agency Development of Policy Through Rule-Making, 59 Nw.
U.L REv. 781 (1965); Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at
Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REv.
485 (1970); Note, The Use of Agency Rulemaking to Deny Adjudications Apparently
Required by Statute, 54 IowA L. REv. 1086 (1969).
16 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c, 717d (1970).
17 15 U.S.C. § 717f (1970).
1s See FPC v. Hunt, 376 U.S. 515, 527 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by

Stewart, J.).
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In analyzing Order No. 435, this article will show how rulemaking
fits into the Natural Gas Act's scheme of regulation. It will include
three major sections: first, a description of Order No. 435 and the allegations attacking it; second, a background section covering the more
conventional ratemaking under sections 4 and 5 and certificate proceedings under section 7 of the Natural Gas Act, in addition to prior rulemaking orders affecting rates from Statement of General Policy No.
61-119 to Order No. 41 1;20 and third, a discussion of relevant judicial
authorities.
ORDER No. 435
[R]ational decision is not furthered by requiring the agency to lose
itself . . .into detail that too often obscures fundamental issues
rather than clarifies them.
Henry J. Friendlyl

ProceduralHistory
This section summarizes chronologically the procedural facts surrounding the issuance on July 15, 1971, of Order No. 435, which established a range of 22.50 to 24.00 cents per thousand cubic feet (Mcf) for
contracts for sales of natural gas in the Rocky Mountain Area dated
after June 17, 1970.
Initially, the Commission issued a Notice 22 on June 17, 1970, stating its proposal to publish rules for the Permian Basin Area fixing the
terms and conditions under which it would issue permanent certificates
and "otherwise regulate" new sales of natural gas. 23 The rates were to
be "firm rates, not subject to refund obligation." 24 Although no specific
terms or conditions were proposed at that time, the Commission did
outline three areas of inquiry "[a]s an aid to interested parties, ' 25 and
requested that such parties, including its staff, submit information useful in ascertaining the terms and conditions that would result in an adequate supply of natural gas for consumers at the lowest rate "consistent
19

24 F.P.C. 818 (1960).

20 44 F.P.C. 1112 (1970).
21 WBEN, Inc. v. United States, 396 F.2d 601, 618 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
914 (1968).
22 35 Fed. Reg. 10152 (1970).
23 Id.

24 Id.
25 Id. The areas of inquiry set forth were (1) an estimation of the costs of exploration

and production of "nonassociated" natural gas on a nationwide basis; (2) the rate of
return and "other factors" set forth in Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747
(1968), and Southern Louisiana Area Rate Cases v. FPC, 428 F.2d 407 (5th Cir.), afj'd
on rehearing, 444 F.2d 125, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970); and (3) the weight to be
accorded various facets in considering producer rates and consumer interests.
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with maintaining an industry structure capable of providing, and mo26
tivated to provide, service with its attendant risks."
The Notice further provided for a public hearing to be held in
Midland, Texas, and allowed interested parties to make oral statements
concerning their views and file written comments. Statements taken
27
were to be transcribed and made part of the record.
A subsequent Notice 28 was issued on July 17, 1970, which expanded
the scope of the proposed rulemaking of the Commission to include all
of the United States except Alaska and Hawaii. 29 This Notice reiterated
that the rates would be final, not subject to refund, but subject to prospective modification at the conclusion of any pending or future area
rate proceeding. Again, no specific rates were proposed, although the
Commission stated, as it had in the June 17th Notice, that the rates
ultimately to be adopted would amend only the initial rate levels established for the Rocky Mountain Area by section 2.56 of the Commission's General Policy and Interpretations.3 0 However, the basic language
of section 2.56, which allows the Commission to issue a certificate without an adjudicatory hearing if the rate is equal to or less than the "inline" price level set forth by the Rules, would not be changed.3 1 A producer would not be precluded from filing for a rate in excess of the
existing area price level and having an adjudicatory hearing to determine whether the proposed rate was "just and reasonable."
Prompted by the second Notice, numerous written statements were
filed and transcripts of public hearings were taken in Midland, New Orleans, Denver, Pittsburgh, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, and Boston.82 Representatives of natural gas companies, consumer groups and
public officials were heard. Staff investigating officers directed questionnaires to seventy large natural gas producers, whose total regulated sales
were in excess of ten trillion cubic feet (Tcf) annually. In addition,
26 35 Fed. Reg. at 10152.
27 Id.
28 35 Fed. Reg. 11638 (1970).
29 Id.

80 18 C.F.R. § 2.56 (1972).
31 18 C.F.R. § 2.56 (1972) provides in part:
"Where a proposed price exceeds the indicated rate level and is therefore conditioned or suspended we will, in determining whether the higher price is
justified, not necessarily consider only the financial requirements of the individual producer proposing the price but will consider all of the above elements
relevant to the industry generally in the area concerned."
(quoting from Statement of General Policy No. 61-1, 24 F.P.C. 818, 820 (1960)). 18 C.F.R.
§ 2.56 is the codification of Statement of General Policy No. 61-1. See pp. 50-51 infra.
82 46 F.P.C. at 71.
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representatives of those producers were required either to appear or to
answer interrogatories.
The staff's investigation produced a report summarizing, on a
nationwide basis, prices and relevant provisions of intrastate sales contracts dated on or after January 1, 1966. Attached to that report was
statistical material concerning: (1) weighted average rates and range of
rates for intrastate sales; (2) delivery conditions and current prices for
intrastate sales for contracts dated in 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970;
(3) contract terms, such as escalation provisions, types of gas, delivery
points, take or pay provisions, and advance payments; and (4) intrastate contractual accelerated take provisions.83
With this as a background, the Commission, on July 15, 1971,
issued Order No. 435,84 establishing by rule rates for contracts entered
into in the Rocky Mountain Area after June 17, 1970.3 5 The Order
added the following paragraph to section 2.56:
The initial rates at which sales of natural gas in the Rocky
Mountain Area are to be certificated, without refund obligation,
83 Docket Nos. 389 & 389A.
34 46 F.P.C. 68 (1971).

85 On July 15, 1971, the Commission also commenced a rulemaking proceeding for
the Rocky Mountain Area entitled Notice Instituting Proposed Rulemaking and Order
Prescribing Procedure in Docket No. R-425, whereby it proposed to fix the "just and
reasonable" rate for all jurisdictional sales of natural gas made under contracts dated before October 1, 1968. The substantive issues raised by Docket No. R-425 are different from
the issues raised by Order No. 435. Docket No. R-425 would "adjudicate" by rule rights of
the parties with respect to sales previously made and rates previously paid.
Prior to any substantive action by the Commission in R-425, numerous natural
gas producers sought judicial review of the Order promulgating the rulemaking pro.
cedure. The Tenth Circuit in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 475 F.2d 842 (10th Cir.
1973), relying on Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968), which it characterized as "dispositive," denied the petitions for review and held that the proposed
rulemaking was consistent with both the Natural Gas Act and the APA. 475 F.2d at
850. It also held that the imposition of a requirement of adjudicatory hearings for rate
setting on the basis that such hearings had been the practice of the Commission in the
past was unwarranted. Id. at 852.
In a strong dissent, which may be the better view, Judge Seth argued that the
Order should be set aside because the right of cross-examination is denied and, equally
important, the record to be made may be procedurally defective and unsuitable for
judicial review. He indicated that the ratemaking process requires both a resolution of
disputed facts and a decision as to whether the rate is just and reasonable or constitutes an unlawful taking of property under the fifth amendment. He also argued
that setting rates by rulemaking was neither properly within either the Natural Gas Act
or the Administrative Procedure Act nor did it meet established standards for a constitutional test of the confiscation issue. Id. at 857.
On July 11, 1973, Chevron Oil Co. filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, 42
U.S.L.W. 3063 (U.S., July 10, 1973) (No. 73-91).
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for sales made under contracts dated after June 17, 1970, are set
forth in Table No. I and.... represent the area rate levels for the
areas involved until such time as the Commission shall promulgate
just and reasonable rates in said area.3 6
Challenges to Order No. 435
The Commission's authority to promulgate in Order No. 435 was
challenged on the grounds that: (1) the proceeding was a denial of due
process because a full evidentiary hearing, complete with cross-examination, was not held; (2) rates set by rulemaking is a denial of due process;
and (3) the precedent established by Moss v. CAB 37 rendered the procedure followed unlawful. 88
Each allegation challenging the procedural posture of Order No.
435 was rejected by the Commission in its opinion accompanying the
Order and in its Order upon rehearing.39 In essence, the Commission
concluded that, since it was uncontroverted that the proceeding was
"rulemaking" and not adjudication, the procedure required to
be followed is that set forth in section 553(c) of the APA, which requires an
evidentiary hearing only when the agency's enabling statute requires
a "hearing" on the record. 40 The Commission stated that since an applicant was under no duty under section 7 to initiate service, there was no
due process requirement that an adjudicatory hearing be held. It then
concluded that a mere request for a hearing by asserting a general need
to cross-examine was insufficient without a showing that a rejection
would be either prejudicial or a denial of due process:
Nowhere, in the requests made, is there any specific proffer as to
the particular subjects that may require oral hearings of the witnesses whose sworn testimony was received, what kind of facts those
that request cross-examination propose to adduce, or by which of
the witnesses they propose to adduce such facts. 41
38 46 F.P.C. at 85. Table No. 1 provides:

Rates in cents per Mcf
Aneth Field ..............................
......
22.50
San Juan ......................................
24.00
Unita-Green River .............................
23.75
Colorado-Julesburg Basin .......................
23.50
Montana-W yoming .............................
22.75
Montana-Dakota ...............................
23.50

Id.

37 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
38 See 46 F.P.C. at 71-73.
39 46 F.P.C. 620 (1971).
40
41

See, e.g., Siegel v. AEC, 400 F.2d 778, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
46 F.P.C. at 73. Professor Davis, in his Administrative Law Treatise, distinguishes
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Finally, the Commission distinguished Moss on the basis of the extensive public hearings and public participation prior to the issuance
of Order No. 435.42
An important distinction critical to the legality of Order No. 435,
which the Commission did not make, but should have, is that it did
not make rates by rule, but merely set by rule the initial rate at which
sales would be certificated without an adjudicatory hearing.
BACKGROUND

[O]ur only interest in the past is for the light it throws upon the
present.
Oliver Wendell Holmes 43
between the two types of hearings: a trial hearing and an argument hearing. As to argument hearings he states:
When adjudicative facts are not in dispute, so that a trial type of hearing is
not required, the most convenient procedure often is an oral argument, that is, a
speech-making or public-meeting type of hearing. This type of hearing is very
common for resolving non-factual issues of law or policy or discretion.
1 K. DAvis, ADMINiTRATiVE LAw TREAThSE, § 7.07, at 432 (1958). The following was noted
as to adjudicative facts and trial hearings:
Facts pertaining to the parties and their businesses and activities, that is,
adjudicative facts, are intrinsically the kind of facts that ordinarily ought not to
be determined without giving the parties a chance to know and to meet any
evidence that may be unfavorable to them, that is, without providing the parties
an opportunity for trial.
Id. at § 7.02, at 413.
42 46 F.P.C. at 72. In Moss, all of the United States air carriers had filed increased
passenger tariffs with the Civil Aeronautics Board. While those increases were pending,
ex parte meetings, which excluded the petitioners who were members of Congress, were held
between the carriers and the Board. Subsequently, a pro forma hearing was held in which
the petitioners were allowed to participate. After the conclusion of the hearing, the Board
issued an order which, while suspending the proposed tariffs, implemented its own rate
formula because of a found need for "additional revenue" on the part of the carriers.
Accordingly, the carriers immediately filed for new increases based on the Board's fare
formula. 430 F.2d at 894-95.
Upon appeal, the petitioners contended that the Board's order in effect was ratemaking. The court found:
As a practical matter, the Board's order amounted to the prescription of rates
because, as the Board admits, the pressures on the carriers to file rates conforming
exactly with the Board's formula were great, if not actually irresistible.
Id. at 897 (footnote omitted). Based on such findings, the court held the Board's action to
be unlawful as "contrary to the statutory ratemaking plan," and remanded for further
proceedings. Id. at 893, 902.
In contrast with Moss, the proceedings leading to the promulgation of Order No. 435
gave adequate notice of the proposed action and provided for several open public hearings
in various cities throughout the United States. Second, the Commission received in oral
and written form extensive technical data, evidence, and comments from private citizens,
groups, pipeline companies, distributors, producers, and state and local authorities.
43 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAxv. L. Rv.457, 474 (1897).
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Ratemaking Under the NaturalGas Act
Just and Reasonable Rates Under Sections 4 and 5. Generally,
sections 4 and 5 of the Natural Gas Act 44 provide for initial determination of rates by natural gas companies, subject to review by the Commission. 45 Section 4 provides for Commission review of a changed rate
either before or after it becomes effective, while section 5 provides for
Commission review of any rate, regardless of how long it may have
been in effect. 46 Under section 4(e) the Commission may order refunds,
47
whereas under section 5(a) it may not.
The Act further contemplates that the rates filed by natural gas
companies may be the rates either which are offered generally to customers or which are determined by contract rates with particular customers. The latter situation was at issue in two Supreme Court cases
which have interpreted these sections.
The decision in United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service
Corp.48 provided that a rate change could not be filed by one party to
a contract. In that case, a regulated gas company attempted to unilaterally change the rates specified in a long term contract with a distribution
company by filing a new rate schedule with the Commission. Justice
Harlan, speaking for the majority, stated that the Natural Gas Act was
not intended "to abrogate private rate contracts as such. '49 Section 4(d)
44 15 U.S.C. §§ 717c, 717d (1970).
45 The standard that rates are to be "just and reasonable" is set forth in section 4(a),
which also provides that any rate not found to be so shall be considered unlawful. 15 U.S.C.
§ 717c(a) (1970). Section 4(d) also requires notice to the Commission prior to any company's
effecting a change in filed rates. 15 U.S.C. § 717c(d).
46 United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 341 (1956).
The Court stated:
These sections are simply parts of a single statutory scheme under which all rates
are established initially by the natural gas companies, by contract or otherwise,
and all rates are subject to being modified by the Commission upon a finding that
they are unlawful....
. . . [Section 5(a)] is neither a "rate-making" nor a "rate-changing" procedure.
It is simply the power to review rates and contracts made in the first instance by
natural gas companies and, if they are determined to be unlawful, to remedy
them. Section 5(a) would of its own force apply to all the rates of a natural gas
company, whether long-established or newly changed, but in the latter case the
power is further implemented by § 4(e). All that § 4(e) does, however, is to add
to this basic power... the further powers (1) to preserve the status quo pending
review of the new rate by suspending its operation for a limited period, and (2)
thereafter to make its order retroactive, by means of the refund procedure ....
(emphasis added by Court).
47 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294 (1963); FPC v. Tennessee Gas Transmission
Co., 371 U.S. 145 (1962).
48 350 U.S. 332 (1956).
49 Id. at 338.
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was construed as a "filing-and-notice requirement." 50 Having so limited
section 4(d), the Court concluded that the Commission had no authority
under this section to grant changes which would not be otherwise
valid. 51
The Act also permits a company and its customers to contract for
a term of years at the company's "going rate." This situation was the
subject of United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water
Division,52 wherein the controlling private contract contained a provision that set the future price according to "any effective superseding
rate schedules" that might be filed with the Commission. 53 The Supreme
Court, again speaking through Justice Harlan, interpreted this clause
to be, in effect, one that provides for a "going" rate, thus allowing
54
United to unilaterally change its rates where warranted.
Section 7 Certificate Proceedings. Although the statutory scheme
of sections 4 and 5 is the primary method of ratemaking under the Natural Gas Act, it is not the exclusive one. Under Section 7(c), 55 the Commission upon application is empowered to issue certificates of public
convenience to anyone "in the transportation or sale of natural gas,
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission." 6 Section 7(e) states
that the Commission may include "such reasonable terms and condi57
tions as the public convenience and necessity may require."
In Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Service Commission (CATCO),58
the Supreme Court has held that reasonable price terms are a condition
which can be validly imposed under section 7(e). CA TCO upheld the
Commission's denial of a certificate when the applicant introduced no
evidence as to the reasonableness of its price. Justice Clark, speaking
for the Court, enunciated the "in-line" price theory:
50 Id. at 339.
51 Id.
52

358 U.S. 103 (1958).

Id. at 105.
54 Id. at 110.
55 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1970).
53

56

Id.

Id. at § 717f(e).
360 U.S. 378 (1959). The Third Circuit, in Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. FPC, 238 F.2d
771 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 923 (1957), commented upon the Commission's
exercise of authority under section 7(e) and the congressional recognition of that authority:
The Commission has assumed it had the power to impose rate conditions on
certificates under the provisions of section 7(e). [citing by year the number of
certificates with rate conditions] "This interpretation of its authority by the Commission through the years must be given considerable weight," especially since left
undisturbed by Congress when the Act was amended in 1954.
238 F.2d at 774 (footnote omitted) (quoting from Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v.
FPC, 232 F.2d 467, 471 (3d Cir. 1956)).
57
58
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The Congress, in § 7(e), has authorized the Commission to condition certificates in such manner as the public convenience and necessity may require. Where the proposed price is not in keeping with
the public interest because it is out of line or because its approval
might result in a triggering of general price rises or an increase in
the applicant's existing rates by reason of "favored nation" clauses
or otherwise, the Commission in the exercise of its discretion might
attach such conditions as it believes necessary. 59

In United Gas Improvement Co. v. Callery Properties, Inc.,60 the
Supreme Court further upheld, as necessary to protect the public interest, the imposition of a condition upon permanent certificates that proscribed rate increases above in-line prices. The restriction was consid-

ered necessary as an interim measure to prevent significant increases
in initial prices while the determination of just and reasonable rates
was pending. 61 The Court found "ample power under § 7(e) for the
Commission to attach these conditions for consumer protection" even

62
though the certificate was a permanent one.
Since the power to condition certificates is expressly provided for
by section 7 of the Act, CA TCO and Callery are not significant precedents for the Commission's authority to condition certificates. However,

since they do reflect judicial recognition of the scope of the Commission's authority to condition certificates by imposing reasonable price
59 360 U.S. at 391. In Public Serv. Comm'n v. FPC, 329 F.2d 242, 249 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 963 (1964), the court held that the Commission had the power to
condition a permanent certificate by requiring refunds of excessive prices charged and
received under temporary certificates even in instances where there was no explicit refund
provision in the temporary certificate. Accord, Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, 378 F.2d 510
(5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 917 (1968). See United Gas Improvement Co. v. FPC,
283 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 879 (1961), wherein the court stated:
Under this provision [7(e)] the Commission is vested with control over the conditions under which gas may be initially dedicated to interstate use.
Among the conditions thus subject to control are those which relate to the
initial price proposed to be charged and paid.
283 F.2d at 820.
0 382 U.S. 223 (1965).
61 Id. at 227. One year prior to Callery, the Supreme Court, in FPC v. Hunt, 376 US.
515 (1964), stated that section 7 stipulates only that the Commission find that the proposed
service be required by public convenience and necessity, not that the Commission find the
initial rate to be just and reasonable. The Court also noted that section 7 does not grant
power to the Commission to suspend a rate authorized in certificates, either permanent
or temporary, under that section. Id. at 521.
62 382 U.S. at 228. In FPC v. Sunray DX Oil Co., 391 U.S. 9 (1968), the Court held
that the Commission, by exercising the power under section 7(e) to condition permanent
certificates, could demand that producers "refund amounts collected under outstanding,
unconditioned temporary certificates in excess of the finally established in-line price."
Id. at 45 (footnote omitted). See also Union Texas Petroleum, 43 F.P.C. 404 (1970); Sinclair
Oil & Gas Co., 40 F.P.C. 410 (1968).
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provisions, they can be considered stepping-stones supporting Order
No. 435 in that they reflect early judicial sanction of an interim technique used to. control prices without resort to adjudication on a company by company basis.
Rulemaking Under the Natural Gas Act
Denial of Adjudicatory Hearing Pursuant to General Rulemaking
Power. The Supreme Court specifically has approved of the adoption
of rules and regulations by federal administrative agencies specifying
the qualifications requisite for authority and, pursuant to such rules,
the dismissal without hearing of applications which failed to comply
with the announced standard.
In United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 3 the Supreme Court
first so held. Storer involved the rulemaking powers of the Federal
Communications Commission under the Federal Communications Act.
The FCC had promulgated amendments to rules limiting the number
of station licenses each party would be allowed to own."
The respondent, a licensee of the maximum number of radio and
television stations allowed by the amendments, had an application for
an additional station denied without a hearing. On appeal, Storer contended that it was entitled to a hearing as to whether grant of its application would be in the public interest. 6 Although recognizing a
hearing requirement in certain instances, the Court remained of the
opinion that as such it was not sufficient to reduce the rulemaking
power of the FCC necessary "for the orderly conduct of its business."68e
The Court concluded:
We do not think Congress intended the Commission to waste time
on applications that do not state a valid basis for a hearing. If any
applicant is aggrieved by a refusal, the way for review is open.67
63 351 U.s. 192 (1956).
64 Id. at 193.
65 Id. at 195.
66 Id. at 202.
67 Id. at 205. See also American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966), in which Judge Leventhal, for the majority, wrote:
It [Storer] rests on a fundamental awareness that rule making is a vital part of the
administrative process, particularly adapted to and needful for sound evolution
of policy in guiding the future development of industries subject to intensive
administrative regulation in the public interest, and that such rule making is not
to be shackled, in the absence of clear and specific Congressional requirement, by
importation of formalities developed for the adjudicatory process and basically
unsuited for policy rule making.
359 F2d at 629.
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In that case, the Fed-

eral Power Commission, after giving interested parties an opportunity
for hearing under section 553(c) of the APA, adopted regulations
specifying permissible price provisions69 in contracts and provided
that contracts containing other provisions "shall be rejected." 70 Texaco's application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity
covering sales, the contracts for which had contained price clauses not
permissible under the regulations, was rejected by the Commission
without grant of a hearing.71 The Tenth Circuit reversed the Commission's decision, holding that the regulations established through a
rulemaking procedure could not be used to deny an applicant the
hearing provided for under section 7.72
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court noted that the regulations had
been adopted in a section 553 rulemaking proceeding in which Texaco
had participated. Since Texaco's application for a certificate contained
price clauses proscribed by the regulations, the Court, relying on Storer,
held that the Commission's rejection of the application without a grant
of an adjudicatory hearing was proper:
[T]he statutory requirement for a hearing under § 7 does not preclude the Commission from particularizing statutory standards
through the rule-making process and barring at the threshold those
who neither measure up to them nor show
reasons why in the pub73
lic interest the rule should be waived.
68 377 U.S. 33 (1964).
69 Id. at 35. See 18 C.F.R. § 154.93 (1972) for the scope of "permissible" provisions.
These include reimbursement to seller for change in production, etc., changes at a definite
date to a specific amount, and, changes by a price-redetermination based on producer rates.
70 377 U.S. at 35.
71 Id. at 36-37.
72 Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 317 F.2d 796, 807 (10th Cir. 1963). Certiorari was granted
because of the conflict between the Tenth Circuit in Texaco and the Ninth Circuit in
Superior Oil Co. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 922 (1964).
In Superior Oil, the Ninth Circuit, in affirming the action of the Commission which had
rejected without hearing Superior's rate schedule and certificate application filings, stated:
[T]he application in a particular case of the explicit standard stated therein no
more entitled persons affected to an evidentiary hearing as to the general merit
of the standard than would have been the case if this concreteness had been
expressed in the statute itself.
322 F.2d at 614.
78 377 U.S. at 39. As one author stated:
The Texaco decision . . . represents the first time that the Supreme Court
has upheld the actual application of a regulation adopted pursuant to a merely
general rule-making power, with the effect of altogether denying a hearing that
would otherwise arise in a statutory adjudication.
Fuchs, Agency Development of Policy Through Rule-Making, 59 Nw. U.L. Ray. 781, 786

(1965).
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In passing on the validity of the regulations, the Court found that the
proceedings held pursuant to section 553 of the APA was adequate "so
far as the price clauses are concerned." 74 Justice Douglas also noted that
in Texaco the conditions for applications under sections 4 and 7 were
provided by ample rulemaking authority, such as was found in Storer.75
Texaco makes it clear that the Commission may adopt rules, in
accordance with section 553 of the APA, which prescribe conditions
pursuant to which it will issue a section 7 certificate proceeding under
the Natural Gas Act. Moreover, the conditions adopted by rulemaking
may impose rate conditions, and applications which fail to meet such
rate conditions may be rejected without an adjudicatory hearing.
Ratemaking is Rulemaking. In Texaco and Order No. 435, the
Commission's exercise of its general rulemaking authority follows an
established line of judicial authority which holds that, when general
rulemaking power is exercised, the fixing of future rates is legislative,
whereas ratemaking as to past periods is judicial.76
In Prentisv. Atlantic Coast Line,77 the Supreme Court passed upon
a challenge to rates set by a state commission. Justice Holmes, speaking
for the majority, recognized that the commission was vested with "legislative, judicial, and executive powers,17 8 but concluded that the process
of rulemaking was legislative in nature:
The establishment of a rate is the making of a rule for the future,
79
and therefore is an act legislative not judicial in kind ....
More recently, a federal district court in Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v.
377 U.S. at 39.
Id. at 41.
The APA defines "rule" as follows:
"[R]ule" means the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect . . . and includes the approval or prescription for the future of rates ....
5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970). The Act further defines "rulemaking":
"[R]ule making" means agency process for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule ....
5 U.S.C. § 551(5).
77 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
78 Id. at 224.
79 Id. at 226. The Ninth Circuit discussed the rulemaking-adjudication dichotomy in
Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949):
The legislative process i.e., rule-making, is normally directed primarily at "situations," rather than particular persons. Individual protestations of injury are
normally and necessarily lost in the quantum of the greater good.
. . . [Adjudication's] primary concern is with individual rights, liabilities for
past conduct, or present status under existing law, and tends to be accusative and
disdplinary in nature.
174 F12d at 693 (footnotes omitted).
74
75
76
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Boyd, s0 noted that, since rulemaking is a legislative process, the agency
is not required to proceed on evidence acquired in formal hearings.
Here, the Civil Aeronautics Board had promulgated a rule limiting
carriers' off-rate charters to a certain percentage of the plane miles
flown by it during the previous calendar year. In arriving at their decision, the court emphasized that an agency could rather act on the
basis of data gathered either informally by its members, contained in
its files, or developed through its expertise. The court viewed the purpose of rulemaking hearings as an opportunity for interested parties to
"present their views" and "submit data and facts.""'
82
In Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway,
the Interstate Commerce Commission attempted to award reparations
to shippers for past periods although the rates for those periods had been
prescribed by the ICC itself. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's ruling to the effect that the ICC, after creating an order which
had the "force of a statute, ' 83 could not disregard its own "quasi-legislative" product by retroactive repeal through a "quasi-judicial" proceeding.8 4 In doing so the Court recognized that ratemaking as to past
periods was judicial in nature:
The Commission's error arose from a failure to recognize that when
it prescribed a maximum reasonable rate for the future, it was performing a legislative function, and that when it was sitting to award
85
reparation, it was sitting for a purpose judicial in its nature.
In light of this body of jurisprudence, when read in conjunction
with the procedures set forth in the APA, a firm foundation for Order
No. 435 can be found, particularly since the Commission also relied on
its general rulemaking authority under section 16 of the Natural Gas
Act.
Section 16 of the Natural Gas Act: Source of the Commission's General
Rulemaking Power
The limits of the Commission's power "to perform any and all
acts" under section 16 and to further "prescribe, issue, make, amend,
and rescind such orders, rules, and regulations as it may find necessary
80 244 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C. 1965).
81 Id. at 892.
82 284 U.S. 370 (1932).
83 Id. at 386 (footnote omitted).
84 Id. at 389.
85 Id.
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or appropriate" ' 6 have not as yet, been fully determined. 7 An extreme
disparity exists as to the outermost limits of such authority. For example, the Tenth Circuit in Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. FPC8 8 has taken
the position that section 16 is a "sweeping grant of administrative authority" to be exercised in the sound discretion of the Commission.
Whereas, it has also been contended that section 16 only grants authority to the Commission to promulgate "housekeeping" or ministerial
rules limited to procedural "minutiae."8 9 However, the latter view
appears to be unnecessarily restrictive.
In FPC v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 90 the Supreme Court
described the Commission's power under section 16 as demanding
a generous construction to enable it to devise effective measures to
meet its responsibilities. Section 16 was specifically referred to by the
Court as assuring to the Commission "the necessary degree of flexibility." 91 The Court repeated the standard first set forth in Permian Basin
Area Rate Cases92 that "the width of administrative authority must be
93
measured in part by the purposes for which it was conferred.
Consequently, section 16 must be read in light of the paramount
86 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1970).
87 One commentator has suggested, in assaying whether an administrative agency has
exceeded its rulemaking authority derived from a general statutory power, that
the search for rulemaking authority becomes not a matter of finding a specific
statutory grant of authority, but rather a search to see if for some reason Congress
has specifically withheld rulemaking authority, intending that the agency proceed
only by traditional adjudicatory methods.
Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 493 (1970). See also
National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, No. 72-1446 (D.C. Cir., June 27, 1973). In a
case of first impression, the court of appeals reversed the district court, 340 F. Supp. 1343
(D.D.C. 1972), and held that the Federal Trade Commission Act confers upon the FTC
the authority to promulgate substantive trade regulation rules. The following language
of the court's opinion is significant in viewing the legality of Order No. 435:
More than merely expediting the agency's job, use of substantive rule-making is
increasingly felt to yield significant benefits to those the agency regulates ...
[U]se of rule-making to make innovations in agency policy may actually be fairer
to regulated parties than total reliance on case-by-case adjudication.
Slip at 17. Cf. Elman, Rulemaking Procedures in the FTC's Enforcement of the Merger
Law, 78 HARV. L. REv. 385, 390-91 (1964); Note, The FTC's Claim of Substantive RuleMaking Power: A Study in Opposition, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 330 (1972).
88 293 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 976 (1962). See also FPC v. East
Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464, 474 n.15 (1950).
89 For many years, section 16 was taken for granted as being limited to regulation
of procedural details. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 258 F.2d 906, 913 (10th Cir.
1958).
90 406 U.S. 621 (1972).
91 Id. at 642.
92 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
93 406 U.S. at 642 (quoting from Permian, 390 U.S. at 776).
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purpose of the Natural Gas Act: the protection of consumers.8 4 Mesa
Petroleum Co. v. FPC,95 and the case therein relied upon, NiagaraMohawk Power Corp. v. FPC, 96 confirm the broad powers granted to the
Commission pursuant to section 16 so long as they conform to the purposes and policies of the Act but do not contravene its express terms.
In Niagara, the Commission published regulations under which
licenses could be issued with retroactive dates of effectiveness. While
97
finding sufficient authority under section 309 of the Federal Power Act
for such regulations, the court declined to place the "necessary and
appropriate" clause of that section on a par with similar clauses in constitutions. However, neither did it find that the scope of authority
under section 309 was restricted to "procedural minutiae." Rather, the
court found that the power authorized by section 309 was lawful so long
as it "conforms with the purposes and policies of Congress and does not
contravene any terms of the Act."98 The court also declared that the
breadth of an agency's discretion was at its zenith when the action assailed related primarily "to the fashioning of policies, remedies and
sanctions," rather than "ascertaining whether conduct violates the statute, or regulations." '9
Although Niagara turned upon an interpretation of section 309 of
the Federal Power Act, the court in Mesa noted that section 16 contained identical language. By drawing a strong analogy between section
309 and section 16 of the Gas Act and reiterating Niagara'slanguage, 1°°
Mesa applied the section 309 construction expounded in Niagara to
section 16.
The teaching of Mesa and Niagara has been adopted in two current decisions by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. City of Chicago v. FPC10 affirmed a rulemaking order which
determined that area prices applicable to independent producers should
apply to pipeline production of natural gas from leases acquired after a
specified date.102 Judge MacKinnon, speaking for the court, stated:
Section 16 of the Act, however, confers on the Commission broad
power to "prescribe, issue, make, amend, and rescind such orders,
94 E.g., Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378, 388 (1959); FPC v. Hope
Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 610 (1944).
95 441 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1971).
98 379 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
97

16 U.S.C. § 825h (1970).

98 379 F.2d at 158 (footnote omitted).

99 Id. at 159.
100 441 F.2d at 187.
101 458 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972).
102 458 F.2d at 733-34.
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rules, and regulations as it may find necessary or appropriate to
carry out the provisions of" the Act, and many of the same regulatory objectives which can be attained through ad hoc proceedings
under Sections 4, 5 and 7 can also be attained through the issuance
of general rules under Section 16.103
The court also noted that although no procedures for exercising
section 16 are provided in the Natural Gas Act, section 553 of the APA
contains the minimum requirements necessary before exercising section
16 power104 Thus, City of Chicago gives broad scope to the Commission's power under section 16 so long as it meets the minimum procedural requirements of section 553 of the APA and a reasoned conclusion
from the record as a whole could support the premise on which the
Commission's action rests. 10 5
In Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC,0 6 the same court produced further
commentary on section 16. Because Mobil is relevant to other areas of
this article, it is discussed at greater depth at a later point. 10 7 Here, however, its interpretation of section 16 is noteworthy.
The court of appeals in Mobil qualified the sweeping interpretation which it gave to section 16 in City of Chicago. The controversy
emanated from orders promulgated by the Commission which set
minimum rates for the transportation of particular liquid and
liquifiable hydrocarbons by natural gas pipelines. It was argued by the
Commission that the scope of the "necessary and appropriate" clause
of section 16 was equivalent to that of a similar phrase in the United
08
States Constitution. The court, relying on the language of Niagara,
rejected this argument and stated that section 16 power, while still
sufficient to carry out the purposes and policies of Congress in enacting
the Act, could not "enlarge the choice of permissible procedures beyond
those that may fairly be implied from the substantive sections and the
functions there defined."' 10 9
Therefore, for the Commission to employ the provisions of section
16, it appears that the following must be demonstrated: (1) the end to
be achieved through the exercise of these powers must be clearly within
the ambit of Commission goals and policies; (2) the powers requested
must bear a rational relationship to the ends to be achieved through
103
104
105
106

Id. at 743 (quoting from 15 U.S.C. § 717o (1970)) (footnote omitted).
458 F.2d at 743.
See discussion pp. 57-59 infra.
No. 72-1471 (D.C. Cir., July 11, 1973).
107 See discussion pp. 60-61 infra.
108 Mobil slip at 32.'
109 Id. at 36-37.
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their use; and (3) the statute must contain no express prohibition of the
exercise of the particular powers requested. As an examination of instances receiving judicial approval show, the powers exercised under
section 16 have been many and varied."-10
Recent Regulatory Policy: Predecessors of Order No. 435
Statement of General Policy No. 61-1. Eleven years prior to the
issuance of Order No. 435, the Commission issued Statement of General
Policy No. 61-1,111 which established for each area of the country guideline prices pursuant to which- the Commission would either grant an
unconditioned initial permanent certificate for producers or suspend a
producer rate filing."12 The rationale for its action was enunciated by
the Commission in an accompanying opinion, PhillipsPetroleum Co.,113
which stated that effective price regulation must be attained through a
"more manageable plan that [sic] the rate base method.""14 The Commission suggested that a better procedure would be "to establish fair
prices for the gas itself and not for each individual producer."' 115
The Commission made it clear that the guideline rates established
in Policy No. 61-1 were not necessarily just and reasonable rates under
either section 4 or 5 of the Natural Gas Act:
110 See, e.g., Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 780 (1968) (restricting
filings under § 4(d) of proposed rates higher than those determined to be just and reasonable); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 385 U.S. 83, 89-90 (1966) (giving Commission power
to regulate purchase of gas where necessary); FPC v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co.,
371 U.S. 145, 155 (1962) (giving Commission power to issue interim orders and direct
refunds); Southern Louisiana Area Rate Cases, 444 F.2d 125, 126-27 (5th Cir. 1970) (giving
Commission power to change past as well as prospective orders); Skelly Oil Co. v. FPC,
375 F.2d 6, 26 (10th Cir. 1967), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Permian Basin Area
Rate Cases, supra (giving Commission authority to impose moratorium on rate increases in order to establish price stability); Hunt Oil Co. v. FPC, 334 F.2d 474, 480
(5th Cir. 1964) (allowing Commission to issue temporary authorization to preserve supplies
of gas); Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. FPC, 281 F.2d 919, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 827 (1961) (providing power to Commission to supplement previous order by
setting out precise amount of refund and the change in rate).
11 24 F.P.C. 818 (1960); as amended 24 F.P.C. 902 (1960); 24 F.P.C. 1107 (1960);
25 F.P.C. 595 (1961); 29 F.P.C. 589 (1963); 30 F.P.C. 1370 (1963); 32 F.P.C. 589 (1964);
33 F.P.C. 682 (1965); 37 F.P.C. 1204 (1967); 40 F.P.C. 503 (1968); 41 F.P.C. 634 (1969); 45
F.P.C. 315 (1971); 46 F.P.C. 68 (1971).
112 24 F.P.C. at 818. The higher price for new gas is to encourage greater production.
11s 24 F.P.C. 537 (1960).
114 Id. at 547. The Commission noted that
regulation of producers on a company-by-company rate base method will in all
probability result in higher consumer prices than we would otherwise have ....
In fact, rigid adherence to the rate base method will, in many cases, price
the producers' gas completely out of the market.
Id. at 546 (footnote omitted).
115 Id. at 547.
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These price levels ... are for the purpose of guidance and initial action by the Commission and their use will not deprive any
party of substantive rights or fix the ultimate justness and reasonableness of any rate level. As with the areas, the prices will be adjusted from time to time as such facts as may come before us compel
such adjustments.11 6
This qualification meant that any price level imposed pursuant to
Statement of General Policy No. 61-1 was only a condition necessary
for a grant of a temporary certificate. 117 Those price levels imposed as
a condition of any permanent certificate would occur only after an adjudicatory hearing. 118
When the Commission first promulgated its guideline rates in 1960,
it did so without a trial-type hearing, basing the rates upon such factors
as (1) cost information from past and pending cases, (2) existing and
historic price structures, (3) production volumes, (4) exploration and
development trends, (5) demand, and (6) existing markets for the gas."19
The Commission has amended Policy No. 61-1 on many occasions as
changes in these factors have occurred. These amendments have also
been accomplished by rulemaking proceedings without trial-type hear12 °
ings.
Although effective only as to guideline prices, the significance of
Statement of General Policy No. 61-1 is that it was the Commission's
initial exercise of its rulemaking authority to effect rates in order to
121
meet a gas shortage.
Order No. 411. Order No. 435 is not the first instance in which
the Commission has set area rates pursuant to its general rulemaking
authority. Approximately one year prior to the issuance of Order No.
435, the Commission promulgated Order No. 411,122 which set area
116

24 F.P.C. at 819-20.

117

See id.

118 Later, in Permian Basin Area Rate Proceeding (Opinion No. 468), 34 F.P.C. 159
(1965), the Commission said regarding Statement of General Policy No. 61-1:
The Commission in prescribing guideline prices attempted to take into account
all of the relevant information available to the Commission at the time. These
guideline prices did not purport to be the just and reasonable rates, but rather
the interim guides the Commission would follow in issuing certificates and in deciding whether to suspend rate increases until just and reasonable rates could be
determined after hearing in area rate proceedings.
Id. at 175.
119 24 F.P.C. at 819.
120 See sources cited note 111 supra.
121 The impetus for Policy No. 61-1 was provided by the Supreme Court's decision
in Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n (CATCO), 360 U.S. 378 (1959). See
pp. 41-42 supra.
122 44 F.P.C. 1112 (1970). On January 28, 1972, petitions were filed to amend § 154.07.
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rates for the Appalachian and Illinois Basin Areas. Although the Appalachian Basin is the oldest gas producing province in the United States,
no judicial review of Order No. 411 was sought. 123 Consequently, Order
No. 411, which resulted from proceedings virtually identical with those
held in Order No. 435, is only persuasive and not determinative upon
judicial review of Order No. 435.
The proceedings underlying the issuance of Order No. 411 were
initiated by Notice 124 when the Commission proposed to issue rules
fixing just and reasonable ceiling rates for the Basin Areas. Attached to
the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was a comprehensive staff report
on the status of natural gas supplies in the Appalachian and Illinois
Basin Areas. 125 The Commission stated that it would revise the proposed
rates "if that appears appropriate in light of the comments.

'12

There-

after, interested parties filed comments and an informal conference was
held.127 No adjudicatory hearing was held.
The Commission rejected an attack that the procedure which had
been followed in Order No. 411 was inadequate because sections 4 and
5 of the Natural Gas Act require an adjudicatory hearing prior to the
Commission taking any action affecting filed rates. Although acknowledging that a full evidentiary hearing is required under those sections
because the certificate holder must continue service even if it objects to
the rates set, the Commission concluded:
Section 7 issues are entirely different. Here an applicant is under
no duty to initiate service until and unless it accepts the certificate,
as conditioned by the Commission. Until such time as it actually
commences service, the producer is legally free to sell gas in the
non-jurisdictional market or to consume or conserve gas for its own
purposes as alternatives to selling in the jurisdictional market.
Thus the applicant has no vested right or duty until it has a certificate. The Commission, therefore, can, and does, legislate in adstandards under which certificates will be issued in the
vance the
8
future.12
Rules of Practice and Procedure promulgated by Order No. 411, by establishing new area
rates which may be charged by independent producers for sales pursuant to contracts
dated on or after February 1, 1972.
123 It may be surmised that the reason that no appellate review of Order No. 411 was
sought was the small amount of production from the Appalachian and Illinois Basin Area.
In 1956 approximately 4 percent of the nation's gas production came from this area. This
percentage gradually declined to 2.1 percent by 1970. FPC, STAFF REPORT No. 2, NATIONAL
GAS SUPPLY AND DEMAND 1971-1990 at 35 (1972).

124 34 Fed. Reg. 17341 (1969).
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 44 F.P.C. at 1115.
128

Id. at 1117.
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The Commission, after reviewing the record which comprised the
staff report, comments of parties, answers to comments and minutes of
the informal conference, concluded that when it applied its expertise
to these materials the procedures followed satisfied the Natural Gas Act
and the APA. 129 It also observed that nowhere in the record was there
any "specific proffer" by a party of an issue which would require oral
hearings. Since there was no "substantial controversy" concerning the
facts in the notice or in the attached staff report, the Commission determined that there had been no showing by any party of a need for a
formal evidentiary hearing. 130
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, if an appellate court had
affirmed Order No. 411 the lawfulness of Order No. 435 would be virtually beyond question. Even though Order No. 411 has not been
judicially sanctioned, it is well established legal doctrine that a contemporaneous construction of an act by those charged with the responsibility
for carrying its provisions into effect is entitled to weight by a review31
ing court.'
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY IN SUPPORT OF ORDER

No. 435

[T]he agencies have gone overboard in their zeal for a record that
will drain the last dregs from the cask-and sometimes a good
many staves as well.
Henry J. Friendly8 2
129 Id. at 1118. The Commission, in noting that the procedures followed met the
rulemaking requirements of both sections 553 and 556(d) of the APA, stated:
[T]hese proceedings are valid since interested persons had "an opportunity to
participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation."
Id. (quoting from 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970)). Furthermore, in this case the parties were given
an opportunity to make an oral presentation; and a record of all the evidence was kept
for consideration. 44 F.P.C. at 1118.
130 44 F.P.C. at 1120.
131 E.g., FTC v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 391 (1959) (retail sales slips construed as invoices under provisions of Fur Products Labeling Act); Magruder v. Washington, Baltimore & Annapolis Realty Corp., 316 U.S. 69, 73 (1942) (section of regulation
in question upheld on grounds that it had a contemporary and long-standing administrative interpretation); United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 549
(1940) (interpretation of section of Motor Carrier Act by Interstate Commerce Commission
given great weight); National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 145 (1920)
(construction of statute by Treasury Department concerning import duties considered
highly persuasive); Edwards's Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 131, 133 (1827) (commissioners' interpretation and administration of North Carolina Act of 1782 accorded
superior weight in proceeding to determine proper construction).
182 Friendly, A Look at the Federal Administrative Agencies, 60 COLJM. L REv. 429,
435 (1960).
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Cross-Examination in Rulemaking Proceedings
Two recent decisions by the Supreme Court have held that where
neither the agency's enabling statute nor the APA require a hearing "on
the record," the parties are not entitled in a rulemaking proceeding to
a hearing that includes the right to present oral testimony, to crossexamine witnesses, and to present oral evidence. Although not dealing
with the Federal Power Commission, each of the cases discussed below
is particularly relevant because each grants approval to rulemaking
proceedings conducted by the Interstate Commerce Commission in its
somewhat innovative attempt to remedy a serious and chronic freight
car shortage.18 3 In both instances the Court concluded that evidentiary
hearings were not required even when, as Justice Douglas noted in
dissent, one of the rules involves "the creation of a new financial
84
liability."1
In United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp.,18 5 a unanimous
Court held that the freight car service rules adopted by the ICC without
an adjudicatory hearing were reasonable under the Esch Car Service
Act of 1917 (Interstate Commerce Act) 1386 and procedurally acceptable
under the APA. 18 7 Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court, rejected
the contention that the rulemaking proceeding was defective because
it failed to comply with sections 556138 and 557139 of the APA. Recogniz183 See generally Note, The Freight Car Shortage and ICC Regulation, 85 HARV. L.
REv. 1583 (1972).
134 United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 252 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
135 406 U.S. 742 (1972).
186 49 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970).
187 406 U.S. at 758.
188 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
A party is entitled to present his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence,
to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination as may be
required for a full and true disclosure of the facts. In rule making or determining
claims for money or benefits or applications for initial licenses an agency may,
when a party will not be prejudiced thereby, adopt procedures for the submission
of all or part of the evidence in written form.
189 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1970) provides:
Before a recommended, initial, or tentative decision, or a decision on agency
review of the decision of subordinate employees, the parties are entitled to a
reasonable opportunity to submit for the consideration of the employees participating in the decisions(1) proposed findings and conclusions; or
(2) exceptions to the decisions or recommended decisions of subordinate employees or to tentative agency decisions; and
(3) supporting reasons for the exceptions or proposed findings or conclusions.
The record shall show the ruling on each finding, conclusion, or exception presented. All decisions, including initial, recommended, and tentative decisions, are
a part of the record and shall include a statement of(A) findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor, on all the
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ing that section 553 requires sections 556 and 557 to be applied only
when the enabling statute mandates that rules "be made on the record
for an agency hearing," Justice Rehnquist noted that section 1(14)(a)
of the Esch Act 140 authorizing the ICC to act "after hearing" did not

constitute such a requirement:
We do not suggest that only the precise words "on the record" in
the applicable statute will suffice to make §§ 556 and 557 applicable
to rulemaking proceedings, but we do hold that the language of
the Esch Car Service Act is insufficient to invoke these sections.' 41
The Court also noted that because the rulemaking was legislative rather
142
than adjudicatory in nature, only an informal hearing was required.
Allegheny-Ludlum was controlling in United States v. Florida East
Coast Railway,143 which reversed, over the vigorous dissent of Justice
Douglas,' a three-judge district court 145 and held that the ICC's rulemaking proceeding setting incentive per diem rates for the use by one
railroad of freight cars owned by another met the requirements of section l(14)(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act even though a full adjudicatory hearing was not held and the ICC had only received written
submissions from interested parties.
After discussing the chronic freight car shortage, Justice Rehnquist
held that the Commission's proceedings were governed by section 553
and that a "hearing" was given as required by section 1(14)(a) of the
Interstate Commerce Act. 146 Employing the full analysis which the
material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record; and
(B) the appropriate rule, order, sanction, relief, or denial thereof.
140 The Esch Car Service Act (Interstate Commerce Act) provides in pertinent part:
The Commission may, after hearing, on a complaint or upon its own initiative
without complaint, establish reasonable rules, regulations, and practices with respect to car service by common carriers by railroad subject to this chapter,
including the compensation to be paid and other terms of any contract, agreement,
or arrangement for the use of any locomotive, car, or other vehicle not owned by
the carrier using it (and whether or not owned by another carrier), and the
penalties or other sanctions for nonobservance of such rules, regulations, or
practices.
49 U.S.C. § l(14)(a) (1970).
141 406 U.S. at 757.
142 Id. Justice Douglas, dissenting in United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S.
224 (1973), states in reference to Allegheny-Ludlum that
the precise words "on the record" are not talismanic, but that the crucial question
is whether the proceedings under review are "an exercise of legislative rulemaking" or "adjudicatory hearings."
Id. at 251.
143 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
144 Id. at 246-56. Justice Stewart concurred with the dissent. Justice Powell took no
part in the consideration or decision. Id. at 246.
'45 Florida East Coast Ry. v. United States, 322 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
146 410 U.S. at 227-28.
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unanimous Court found convincing in A llegheny-Ludlum, Justice
Rehnquist stated that the conclusion of the district court was based on
an assumption inconsistent with Allegheny-Ludlum: namely, the belief
that section 1(14)(a) required that rulemaking be made "'on the record
after opportunity for an agency hearing.' "147
Although unnecessary for the decision, the Court proceeded to explain in broad language what "hearing" meant under the APA:
"[H]earing" as used therein does not necessarily embrace either the
right to present evidence orally and to cross-examine opposing
witnesses, or the
right to present oral argument to the agency's
148
decisionmaker.
The Court, citing Texaco, also noted that a statute requiring a
hearing prior to rulemaking may sometimes be satisfied by a procedure
which only meets the standards of 553. Similarly, when 556 is brought
in through a statutory requirement of a rulemaking procedure "on the
record," subsection (d) of 556 permits the agency to "proceed by the
submission of all or part of the evidence in written form 'if a party will
not be prejudiced thereby.' "149 The Court thus concluded that there
may be instances where a statutory mandate that the "proceedings take
place on the record after hearing" may be met by evidence submitted
in written form only' 50
Although FloridaEast Coast is consistent with established case law
and reason, 151 it fails to discuss adequately: (1)whether the plaintiffs
had been prejudiced by the ICC's procedure, and (2) whether the order
was tantamount to a rate order. While Justice Douglas in his dissent
argued that the order set rates and that "ratemaking must be based on
evidential facts, ' 152 it is the issue of prejudice which should have merited
further discussion by the Court. Justice Douglas further stated that
"the issue is the narrow one of whether written submission of evidence
without oral argument was prejudicial." 153
Id. at 236-37 (quoting from 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970)).
Id. at 240.
149 Id. at 241.
150 Id.
151 See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF JUsTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINIs'rRATIvE PRocEDuRE Acr (1947) which states:
[I]n rate making and licensing proceedings, which frequently involve extensive
technical or statistical data, the agency may require that the mass of such material
be submitted in orderly exhibit form rather than be read into the record by
witnesses. . . . Typically, in these cases, the veracity and demeanor of witnesses
are not important. It is difficult to see how any party's interests would be prejudiced by such procedures where sufficient opportunity for rebuttal exists.
Id. at 78.
152 410 U.S. at 253-54.
153 Id. at 251.
147
148
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The district court below in Florida East Coast had enjoined the
ICC rulemaking order as to the plaintiffs essentially on the ground that
they "were prejudiced by the summary procedures of the Commission. 11 54 That finding was consistent with the reasoning of Judge
Friendly in the earlier and related case of Long Island Railroad v.
United States,155 which dismissed the complaint seeking to enjoin enforcement of the same rulemaking order under review in Florida East
Coast because the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that it was prejudiced by the denial of its requests for cross-examination and oral argu156
ment.
FloridaEast Coast supports the validity of Order No. 435. In both
instances, an administrative agency, acting in response to a crisis resulting from a resource shortage and in accordance with its enabling statute,
established by rule a proposed solution. Unlike Florida East Coast,
Order No. 435 is predicated on a virtually uncontroverted finding of
an energy crisis. It also permitted extensive public participation in the
proceeding and has not set any rate other than that at which it will issue
a certificate without a hearing. Moreover, the findings in both instances
give strict construction to the hearing requirements of the APA.
Rulemaking Proceedings Pursuant to Section 553
Although the rulemaking proceeding under review in City of
Chicago v. FPCI57 was based on "a full and complete evidentiary record
of extensive hearings before the Commission,"' 15 the discussion by the
322 F. Supp. at 728. Judge Simpson noted specific examples of prejudice:
For instance, the Seaboard noted in its statement of position its recent acquisition
of large numbers of specialty cars in reliance on the well-established Commission
principle that a railroad's primary duty is to provide effective service to the
shippers in its area, and pointed out that the sudden emphasis by the Commission
on unequipped boxcars to the exclusion of other cars would punish the Seaboard
for its reliance. Seaboard questioned the foundation for the board's order, labeling
it an experiment the results of which the Commission was unable to predict.
Seaboard also contested the "earmarking" aspect of the funds received by each
railroad from the . . . incentive per diems.
154

Id.
155 318 F. Supp. 490 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
156 Judge Friendly stated:
If, on examining the data, the Long Island had pointed to specifics on which it
needed to cross-examine or present live rebuttal testimony and the Commission
had declined to grant an oral hearing, we would have a different case. Instead the
Long Island's request for an oral hearing was silent as to any respect in which
the Commission's disclosure of greater detail or cross-examination of the Commission's Staff was needed to enable it to mount a more effective argument against
the Commission's proposal.
318 F. Supp. at 499.
157 458 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972). See discussion
at pp. 48-49 supra.
158 Id. at 740-41.
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court of the scope of judicial review, the adequacy of the record, 159 and
the procedures followed by the Commission warrants analysis.
In City of Chicago, the court of appeals was asked to review a
decision of the Commission which required that gas produced by natural
gas pipeline companies pursuant to leases acquired after a specified date
be valued at the area rate applicable to independent producers.160 After
first reviewing the problem of regulating natural gas rates, 16 1 the court
turned to the scope of review. It first rejected arguments that the scope
of review of rules was much narrower than that of orders resulting from
adjudicatory proceedings. 162 While some inquiry into the factual basis
for rules was found to be required, the nature of the inquiry was dependent not on whether a rule or an adjudicatory order had been issued,
but on the nature of the record available for review. 163
In broad language, the court rejected the "substantial evidence
test" in section 553 proceedings. 16 4 This was based on the recognition
159 In Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
the District of Columbia Circuit held that an adjudicatory-type hearing was not necessary
before promulgation of motor vehicle safety standards by the Department of Transportation. The court found that the hearing conducted pursuant to section 553 of the APA was
adequate and there was no need to follow the "formal" procedures set forth in sections
556 and 557. A record consisting of submissions made in response to written comments
was compiled in the proceeding and made available for filing with the court and for
possible remand for further data. Id. at 336.
Although the determination that an informal proceeding was adequate in effect
rendered moot the contention that the hearing was defective because it was not accompanied by sufficient findings, the court addressed itself at length to this issue. It rejected
the argument as follows:
We do not expect the agency to discuss every item of fact or opinion included
in the submissions made to it in informal rule making. We do expect that, if the
judicial review which Congress has thought it important to provide is to be meaningful, the "concise general statement of . . . basis and purpose" mandated by
Section 4 [553] will enable us to see what major issues of policy were ventilated by
the informal proceedings and why the agency reacted to them as it did.
Id. at 338 (quoting from 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970)). This language is of importance in
"evaluating" the completeness of Order No. 435, as it did not fully discuss all of the
areas of inquiry outlined in the Notices instituting the procedure.
160 458 F.2d at 733-34.
161 Id. at 734-37.
162 Id. at 741-42.
163 Id. at 743. The court had previously rejected an analysis based on the rulemaking-

adjudication dichotomy:
In many cases, it is unnecessary, and even unwise, to classify a given proceeding as either adjudicatory or rule-making. The line between the two is frequently a thin one and resolution of a given problem will rarely turn wholly
on whether the proceeding is placed in one category or the other. Moreover,
obsession with attempts to place agency action in the proper category may often
obscure the real issue which divides the parties and requires our resolution.
Id. at 739 (footnote omitted).
164 Id. at 744. For a discussion of this test, see Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
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that the type of record available may vary considerably, depending upon
the nature of the inquiry. Because the record for section 553 proceedings is often more general and conclusory in nature, the court recognized that the substantial evidence test would be of little value. 165
Rather, the court stated that the object of judicial review was to determine "whether a reasoned conclusion from the record as a whole could
support the premise on which the Commission's action rests."'1 66

The focus of City of Chicago is on the resulting record so long as
minimal procedural requirements have been satisfied. In effect, the
court has granted broad latitude to the Commission's choice of procedures if the result is within the ambit of authority delegated by the
Natural Gas Act. As Judge MacKinnon wrote:
The ability to choose with relative freedom the procedure it will
use to acquire relevant information gives the Commission power to
realistically tailor the proceedings to fit the issues before it, the
information it needs to illuminate those issues and the manner of
presentation which, in its judgment, will bring
before it the rele167
vant information in the most efficient manner.
340 U.S. 474 (1951); Jaffe, Judicial Review: "Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record,"
64 HARV. L. REv. 1233 (1951).
In Gooding v. Willard, 209 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1954), Chief Judge Chase defined "substantial evidence" to mean
more than evidence which, considered by itself alone, would be sufficiently persuasive to induce the trier of fact to give it the credence and weight essential
to support findings. It must have those characteristics to such an extent that in
the setting made by the entire record the trier may reasonably find in accordance
with it after giving due consideration to whatever else is shown both in opposition
or in accord.
Id. at 916.
165 458 F.2d at 744.
166 Id.
167 Id. In Hunt Oil Co. v. FPC, 424 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1970), Judge Thornberry stated
that nothing in either the Natural Gas Act or the APA requires a hearing prior to
establishing initial rates pursuant to the Commission's rulemaking authority. Hunt
affirmed the proceedings conducted by the Commission in which independent producers
were ordered to refund monies pursuant to rates made retroactively effective by the
Commission in compliance with the Supreme Court's decision in Permian Basin Area
Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968). Id. at 983, 985. Subsequent to the Permian proceedings, the
Commission required all parties who had not had their matters consolidated to show
cause why the area rates set should not be applied to establish their refund liability.
At the hearing, the Commission rejected arguments because they raised no questions of
fact requiring an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 984.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed on the narrow ground that, because no
"individual" adjudicatory questions were presented, the Commission was not "technically"
required to hold hearings before applying area rates to determine refunds. Id. at 988.
It is significant in Hunt that the refund obligation was imposed not only upon those
producers who were issued temporary certificates conditioned upon possible refund liability, but also upon those producers who initiated price increases subject to possible

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:31

In Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC,168 the same court which decided City
of Chicago held that informal section 553 procedures were not adequate
to set specific minimum rates by rule pursuant to sections 4 and 5 of
the Act, 169 and that the standard of evidence which must be met in such
a proceeding is that of substantial evidence. Although involving ratemaking procedures under sections 4 and 5 rather than certificate proceedings, Mobil is of interest because of its discussions of FloridaEast
Coast, its finding of a substantial evidence requirement in the Natural
Gas Act, and because it is the court which will decide the legality of
Order No. 435.170
As noted earlier, 7 1 the subject of controversy in Mobil was certain
orders promulgated by the Commission which set minimum rates for
the transportation of particular liquid and liquifiable hydrocarbons by
natural gas pipelines. Mobil, a producer of natural gas affected by the
rates, challenged their legality on several grounds, including (1) that
the Commission did not have the jurisdiction to set rates for liquid and
liquifiable hydrocarbons; (2) the Commission unlawfully used privileged data in establishing the rates; (3) the Commission did not use
adequate procedures in setting these rates; and (4) there was no eviden17 2
tiary basis for the promulgation of the rates.
The court held that the Commission had jurisdiction over liquifiable hydrocarbons only. However, the case was vacated and remanded
on the basis of the latter two contentions made by Mobil. As to the
procedural requirements, the court found that the Commission was not
obligated to use the formal rulemaking procedures outlined in sections
556 and 557 of the APA as there was no requirement in the Natural
Gas Act that a hearing be "on the record." On this specific point, the
court relied on FloridaEast Coast.78 Yet neither did the court find that
a section 553 proceeding was adequate. Relying on City of Chicago, the
refund liability during the eight year proceeding. The latter's contention that the Commission's refund order was a denial of due process and subjected them to surprise was
rejected. Id. at 986-87.
168 No. 72-1471 (D.C. Cir., July 11, 1973).
169 In doing so, the court disagreed with the Tenth Circuit's decision in Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 475 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1973), which upheld ratemaking procedures
pursuant to section 553 proceedings. The District of Columbia Circuit rather agreed with
the dissenting opinion in that case by Judge Seth. This author has already taken a similar
view. See note 35 supra.
170 See note 4 supra.
171 See p. 49 supra.
172 Mobil slip at 2.
173 Id. at 22-24.
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court found that the nature of the proceedings warranted greater procedural safeguards than were offered in section 553.174
Similarly, because the Natural Gas Act states that factual determinations must be supported by substantial evidence, 75 the court
concluded that the Act requires "that facts be determined and reviewed
with a greater degree of certainty than is possible under the 'informal'
methods of section 553 of the APA."' 17 On this point the court distinguished FloridaEast Coast on the grounds that the Interstate Commerce Act made no requirements of substantial evidence for factual
determinations.
Although there was a finding of a requirement for substantial evidence, the court clearly limited its holding to the rate-setting procedures
at issue. Thus, the finding of the substantial evidence requirement is
not controlling on the question of whether the section 553 procedures
utilized in promulgating Order No. 435 were adequate. Consequently,
the issue of whether these informal procedures can be used in a section
7 certificate proceeding has not been precluded by Mobil.
CONCLUSION

Litigation is an excessively slow, expensive, clumsy and inadequate
process for resolving technical and complex economic issues.
177
Philip Elman
Order No. 435 is neither an unlawful exercise of the Federal Power
Commission's rulemaking authority nor a dramatic departure from the
pattern of judicially approved Commission actions. To the contrary, it
is a realistic, reasoned, and procedurally proper exercise of the Commission's delegated regulatory power.
The failure of an administrative agency to take prompt and definitive action in the face of overwhelming pressure has been catalogued. 178
Furthermore, the virtues of rulemaking have been advocated as the best
solution of the regulatory work load. 179 The Supreme Court in Texaco
174

Id. at 24-30.

175

15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1970) states in pertinent part: "The finding of the Commission

as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive."
176 Mobil slip at 41.
177 Elman, A Modest Proposalfor Radical Reform, 56 A.B.A.J. 1045, 1048 (1970).
178 Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition
of Standards,75 HARv. L. REy. 863 (1962).
179

One commentator has delineated the following eight advantages of rulemaking,

including (1) notice and opportunity for comment, (2) advanced planning, (3) retroactivity
and reliance, (4) uniformity of application, (5) flexibility of procedure, (6) distortion of
the adjudicative process, (7) accessibility and clarity of formulation, and (8) judicial review.
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urged the Federal Power Commission to depart from individual hearings as a primary regulatory method:
To require the Commission to proceed only on a case-by-case
basis would require it . . . to repeat in hearing after hearing its
conclusions that condemn all of them ....
We see no reason why

under this statutory scheme the processes of regulation need be so
prolonged and so crippled. 8 0
The absence of an opportunity for cross-examination and an adjudicatory hearing does not render Order No. 435 defective.'
The Administrative Procedure Act makes no attempt to prescribe uniformity
of rulemaking procedures. Instead, as has been shown, "it provides minimal standards for party participation, not going beyond the requirement of opportunity to make written presentations and to 'appear.' "182
One commentator recently has criticized the Commission's abandonment of the procedure in which it formulated and applied "subsidiary ratemaking criteria as interpretive rulemaking in an adversary
adjudicative setting" in favor of the "semi-private, less adversary context
of formal rulemaking"'18 as proposed by Order No. 435 and other notices.' 8 4 It has been asserted that the new rulemaking procedures fence

out the public, remove the Commission's staff from the advocate-adver8 5
sary role, and insulate settlement proposals from effective scrutiny.
Such criticism is not without merit regarding a proceeding in
which the Commission proposes to set just and reasonable rates by rulemaking. However, that criticism is inapposite to Order No. 435, which
is merely a certificate proceeding under section 7. Optimally, the rate
level set in such a proceeding is much like the rate which would result,
absent competition, from market forces. If the rate is too low, the
applicant will not undertake service. The notion that the rate can be
too high is best answered by Justice Jackson:
Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative
Policy, 78 HARV. L REv. 921, 930-42 (1965).
180 377 U.S. at 44 (footnote omitted). That comment is timely especially since there is
a proposal in the President's Energy Message to de-regulate interstate sales of natural gas.
Wall Street Journal, April 10, 1973, at 3, col. 1. Of course, de-regulation has been opposed
as being anti-consumer. Washington Post, April 27, 1973, § A, at 2, col. 3; New York Times,
June 27, 1973, at 97, col. 5. In addition the Federal Trade Commission has asserted that the
shortage is a "hoax." Washington Post, June 29, 1973, § A, at 1, col. 1.
181 Cf. Boyd, A Hearing Examiner Comments on the APA and the Rule Making or
Adjudication Controversy, 11 Wm. & MARY L. RFv. 424,445-46 (1969).
182 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISRATIVE LAw TREATIsE, § 6.01, at 360 (1958) (footnote omitted).
183 Dakin, Ratemaking as Rulemaking-The New Approach at the FPC: Ad Hoc
Rulemaking in the Ratemaking Process, 1973 DuK L.J. 41, 46.
184 E.g., Docket No. R-425. See discussion note 35 supra.
185 Dakin, supra note 183, at 83.
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[I]f the supply is not too plentiful and the price is not a sufficient
incentive to exploit it and fails to bring forth the quantity needed,
the price is unwisely low, even if it does square perfectly with somebody's idea of return on a "rate base."' 18
Order No. 435 has fulfilled all of the standards of the Natural Gas
Act, Administrative Procedure Act and related court decisions. The
words of one commentator are particularly appropriate in conclusion:
On balance, however, the survival of a questionable rule seems
somewhat more likely when it is submerged in the facts of a given
case, at least if the governing statute contains no express grant of
authority to issue "legislative regulations." Such a grant may well
lead the court to manifest more deference to an exercise of discre87
tion that is cut in the rulemaking mold.
Upon judicial review, the action of the Federal Power Commission
should be affirmed because Order No. 435 is sound as a matter of law,
procedure and policy.
186 Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581, 612 (1945) (Jackson,
curring).
187 Shapiro, supra note 179, at 946-47 (footnote omitted).

J.,

con-

